Spanish life is not always likeable but it is
compellingly loveable.
-
Christopher
Howse: A
Pilgrim in Spain.
Cataluña and Spain
- There are some, of course, who think that Rajoy will benefit in the rest of Spain from the Catalan mess he helped create. Click here on this.
- Spain is on course for more than 80m tourists this year, way up on last year's record figure. The concern, of course, is that some of these will go (back) elsewhere if and when terrorist concerns diminish.
- Other visitors are rather less welcome, though Spain seems to handle the challenge very well.
- One of the minor incivilities of the Spanish is that - unlike me! - they don't return café newspapers to the rack. Forcing one to ask for the paper resting beside a coffee cup on one of the tables. Still mildly irritating after 17 years, even though the response is invariably polite. Independentismo, I guess. Or selfishness, as we call it . . .
- Rather more seriously, this is an article from El País on the thorny issue of 'historical memory'. There's a translation at the end of this post.
The EU
- According to the author of the seond article at the end of this post, Germany is making Europe more unstable. Selfishness is not confined to the Spanish, it seems. As if anyone ever thought it was.
The UK
- Two interesting sentences read in the past few days. Both jive with my beliefs:
- There is a bizarre
Remainer myth that Leavers are obsessed with the Second World War and
with recreating the British Empire that Churchill cherished. Yet no
one who supports leaving the European Union thinks Brexit is an
imperial or martial project.
- The bonds of class have
weakened to the point where age is now a more reliable guide to
voting behaviour and that is without even mentioning national
identity, which has changed both Scottish and British politics beyond
recognition.
The
Spanish Language
- I just checked on the RAE's definition of independentismo. The response:- La palabra Independentismo no está registrada en el Diccionario. La entrada que se muestra a continuación podría estar relacionada: independentismo[sic]. And the definition of the different(?) word applies only to countries or regions. I must have meant individualismo. Which the RAE defines as: Tendencia a pensar y obrar con independencia de los demás sin sujetarse a normas generales. Of course, it depends what country you're in as to what the normas generales are.
Galicia
- I have to say I told you so. Why yourSpanish octopus might not be Spanish after all.
Finally
- Liverpool will pay their new (Dutch) defender c. €200,000 a week. I guess it makes sense to someone.
Today's Cartoon
THE ARTICLES
ARTICLE 1
The forgetfulness that
doesn't end: Gregorio Marañón and Bertrán de Lis
In Spain, historical
memory is conspicuous by its absence. It is no longer oblivion but,
as Sor Juana Ines de la Cruz would say, something worse - the denial
of memory. And the historical memory that I now demand is not the
memory of either of the two Spains that froze hearts, but a memory
that integrates everyone's memory and illuminates our past so that
our today and our tomorrow will be different.
The Law of Historical
Memory is one of the least read and most cited texts of our
legislation. In its statement of purposes, it invokes "the
spirit of reconciliation and concord that guided the
Transition", that spirit which gives meaning "to the most
fertile constitutional coexistence model that we have ever enjoyed".
It also states that the time has come for "Spanish democracy and
the living generations to recover[?]
forever all those who directly suffered the injustices and
grievances inflicted on them, whether because of one or other
political or ideological reason or because of religious beliefs."
And, finally, it establishes that this Law must inspire public
policies directed towards knowledge of our history.
I read, years ago, an
article on the historical memory by the excellent writer Manuel
Rivas, in which he wondered why historical memory awakens so much
hostility on the Spanish Right, and claimed the democratic memory is
identified with a search for the remains of those murdered by
the Francoists. It reminded me of a recent article in which he almost
reproduced that earlier one.
The author
distinguishes between historical memory and literary memory,
inclining towards the latter, because it encourages "the lived
and the imagined". This subordination of the effort to discover
the truth, which is the essence of the social science of History, in
favour of what he describes as a "remembered present," is
dangerous. In the words of another great writer, Rosa Montero, "To
remember is to lie", because "memory is a conjurer, a
magician expert in slight-of-hand". Nor is it defensible that
the democratic memory be reduced to a search of those murdered by
only one side.
I belong to the
generation that produced the Transition, and I always active in
democratic opposition to the dictatorship from progressive positions.
Why does historical memory awaken hostility in a sector of the
Spanish Right?
The democratic republic
of 1931 was destroyed in 1934, when a part of the Spanish Left did
not accept the result of the general elections and provoked a
revolutionary coup d'état. In 1936, after the assassination of Calvo
Sotelo, the military rebellion broke out, and the government
renounced the monopoly of force by arming trade unions and political
parties. This decision, which conflicted with the essence of the Rule
of Law, had tragic consequences. From that moment, both fascists and
their companions, like the socialists, communists and anarchists,
committed thousands of murders, so many that today it is difficult to
find a Spaniard on both sides who does not have in their family both
someone who was murdered and also, although the oblivion here is
understandable, murderers or accomplices of those crimes. These
generalized massacres are complicated if we remember that the
anarchists were not only killed by the fascists but also by the
communists.
On my side, my maternal
grandfather was 70 years old in 1936 when he was violently removed
from his home by militiamen, in front of the terrified look of his
young children, to be shot against the wall of the Aravaca cemetery.
He belonged to a liberal family that, in the nineteenth century, had
known exile, persecution and also shootings by absolutist
governments. I have to thank my mother for not telling me about this
event in detail, and avoiding any resentment on my part. When he
died, already very old, I discovered among his papers the official
list with the names of the murderers, and I decided to destroy it.
My paternal
grandfather, one of the three founders of the Group at the Service of
the Republic, when Calvo Sotelo died, wrote to his friend and
Minister of Public Instruction, Marcelino Domingo, "The vile,
the infamous murder of Calvo Sotelo by the Republic guards, of those
who have not yet been convicted, by which the Government gives the
impression of incredible leniency, shames us and infuriates those who
fight against the monarchy. Spain is ashamed and outraged. This
cannot be. All of us who were the past have to be against what's
happening today. We are not the enemies of the regime, but are those
who struggle to bring it about, not fascists, but the liberals of
always, and that is why we speak like this now." Months later,
after having been taken to the HQ of the secret police, which which
he left in fear and without being able to say a word, the government
of the Republic made it easier for him, together with Ramón Menéndez
Pidal and their respective families, to leave Spain because it was
not in a position to defend their lives. He remained in exile for
six years and his assets were seized by the Franco government, which
also stripped him of his university chair and his position in the
Provincial Hospital.
The terrible period of
the War was followed by almost four decades of dictatorship. As the
poet wrote "time engenders decades . . . though that admirable
unit of measurement, which Livy used to tell the story of Rome, seems
disproportionate to describe the life of any of us." In effect,
that period of time, which increasingly will seem to us, in
historical terms, shorter, truncated the lives of many Spaniards.
Despite the time that
has elapsed, it seems that we cannot talk about our assassinated and
our assassins without an emotion that brings with it the temptation
to forget the murdered and their murderers. Let's be who we are, one
and the other. However, there is a real civic urgency for Spaniards
today to finally assume the horrors of the civil war and the forty
years of dictatorship without separating some victims from others,
understanding what happens when hatred takes over our coexistence.
That same hate which has reappeared in Catalonia dividing the
Catalans with the same Cainite feelings that the Transition wanted to
overcome.
The historical memory,
when approached partially by the heirs of one of the two Spains,
constitutes the biggest obstacle to the definitive implementation of
Azaña's "Peace, mercy, forgiveness" - a forgetting that
is not forgetfulness but reconciliation.
Gregorio
Marañón is
a member of the Real Academia de Bellas Artes de San Fernando.
ARTICLE 2
Germany
is making Europe more unstable
Should
the biggest and richest country in Europe try to solve the
continent’s problems? Germans shudder at the thought. Last time we
tried leadership, it ended badly, they say, with a distinctive mix of
self-righteousness and smugness.
In
the postwar decades, West German politicians’ role was to be
contrite, generous, obedient and patient. The United States led the
West. West Germany ran western Europe jointly with France.
Originality in foreign policy was discouraged. The main exception was
“Ostpolitik”, eastern policy, in which West Germany used
softly-softly tactics to weaken the Soviet grip on eastern Europe.
Yet
all over the continent burning questions demand answers from
decision-makers in Berlin. Regarding the leadership of Europe, France
is weaker than Germany but more ambitious. President Emmanuel Macron
wants to turn the eurozone into something like a country, with
common economic and financial policies. France will accept German
leadership in this but Germany has to shoulder the bill. Germany,
still lacking a government since the September election, has no
answer.
Germans
revile Donald Trump’s administration but are unwilling to accept
the consequences. Europe, bigger and richer than the US, should start
taking care of its defence. But at what cost and at whose behest?
German
politicians are unwilling to tell their voters that European security
means dealing with the xenophobic kleptocracy in Russia, which
instigates conflicts abroad to distract from stagnation and failure
at home. Yet German public opinion loathes the idea of confrontation
with the Kremlin, despite abundant evidence of attacks on the
political system, including bribery, cyber-intrusions, espionage and
subversion of both the far left and far right.
Also
on the to-do list are a common European counter-terrorism strategy,
which will mean slaying German sacred cows on how data is transmitted
and stored, and a proper European strategy on migration. Germany also
flinches from confronting authoritarianism in Poland and Hungary. It
struggles to articulate a view on Brexit.
For
now, the excuse is political deadlock. Coalition talks restart in
January but serve only to highlight the vacuum at the heart of
Europe. Angela Merkel, once invincible, is gravely weakened.
Even if she manages to form a government she will be a lame-duck
chancellor.
The
German political elite has grasped part of the problem. Sigmar
Gabriel, the foreign minister and a bigwig in the Social Democrats,
likes to talk about how Donald Trump’s “America First” policies
make the world a more dangerous place. What he and his liberal-minded
counterparts fail to grasp is that they are pursuing a no less
solipsistic approach. Whereas the American president drenches his
foreign policy in bombast, politicians in Berlin pursue a
“Germany First” policy but clothed in hypocrisy. When it comes to
Russia, China or Iran, the German instinct is to put big trade deals
first and allies second.
A
striking example is the proposed Nord Stream 2 pipeline across the
Baltic Sea, which will bring Russian gas to Germany, bypassing east
European friends and allies such as Ukraine. The project is clearly
political: the aim is to entrench Russia’s role as Germany’s main
energy supplier. Yet German politicians insist that the project is a
purely commercial one and angrily reproach critics for “politicising”
the supposedly neutral business of international gas deliveries.
As
Jamie Kirchick points out on the Politico website, what
Germany is doing here is ruthlessly pursuing its national interest,
cheap gas, while ignoring the wider European considerations of
diversity in energy supplies. It is pursuing a nationalist,
unilateralist policy, dressed up in the language of non-intervention.
German
introspection, coupled with economic clout, is a dangerous
combination. Failure to make a decision is itself a decision and can
make matters worse. In short, Europe’s biggest country exports
instability. East European countries are increasingly worried
by German irresponsibility. Earlier this month I
spent a week in Berlin with a dynamic Lithuanian delegation that is
trying to wake up German opinion. Our most effective argument was not
trans-Atlantic solidarity (a hard sell in the Trump era) but an
appeal to German historical responsibility.
Yes,
Germany feels guilty towards Russia because of the traumas of the
Second World War. But Germany should surely accept even greater
responsibilities towards the countries of eastern and central Europe,
consigned to the meat-grinder by the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939. It
was in these countries, not Russia, that the Holocaust resulted and
it was these formerly peaceful independent states that became the
captive nations of the Soviet empire. It would be odd if Germany
again conspired with the Kremlin to do down the countries in between,
especially when they are now, in economic terms, vastly more
important than Russia. Poland alone is double Russia’s size as a
trade partner.
The
greatest contradictions are on the German left, which decries
imperialism and other wickedness but seems not to notice that a
real-life empire in its eastern neighbourhood is busily
re-establishing a hegemonic grip on former colonies. If any
western country treated its former imperial subjects the way Russia
treats Ukraine, then progressive Germans would be up in arms.
Similarly, German liberal opinion ought to detest the way in which
the Putin regime promotes gay-bashing, sectarian and
ethno-nationalist causes, both inside Russia and abroad.
A
new Ostpolitik, stressing solidarity and responsibility, is urgently
needed. But for too many Germans, bashing the distant evils of
Trump’s America is so much easier.
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