Thoughts from Galicia: 25.10.17

Spanish life is not always likeable but it is compellingly loveable.

- Christopher Howse: A Pilgrim in Spain. 

If you've arrived here because of an interest in Galicia or Pontevedra, see my web page here.

Life in Spain

• Cataluña 1: A Spanish commentator last week saw Presidents Puigdemont and Rajoy as two leaders who'd taken themselves to the brink and were now trying to negotiate from the bottom of the gorge. I tend to see them as 2 short-sighted, incompetent opportunists who are each playing to the other's advantage.
• Cataluña 2: The view of the Basque president, who has a dog in this fight, of course: I cannot understand or share Madrid’s approach to either Basque autonomy or the Catalan crisis. I write this as the democratically elected president of the autonomous Basque region of Spain, as someone who is both strongly pro-Europe and who believes firmly in self-determination, whichever institutional form that takes.
• Cataluña 3: More immediately . . . El País informs us that: The first cracks have appeared in the PP-PSOE pact over the use of Article 155; the PSOE rules out intervening in Cataluña if Puigdemont calls an election. This is my guess at what the Catalan government will do next. For what have they got to lose? Especially as regards burnishing their alleged democratic credentials on the international stage.
• Cataluña 4: Medium term, the huge question looms – How exactly is Madrid going to impose itself on Cataluña? Here's the Bloomberg take on this. Extracts: Another's view on the Spanish President: Rajoy is playing with fire . . . . Federalism is a delicate balance. True, the Catalan government violated the letter and spirit of the Spanish constitution by toying with a declaration of independence. But if Rajoy goes too far in retaliation, the very idea of self-governing communities may evaporate. . . The lesson from constitutional history is: tread lightly.
• Spain: Sevilla has been named – by Lonely Planet – as the best city in the world to visit.

The EU and Spain/Cataluña: Only political dialogue can bring stability to Catalonia – and the EU must help, says the president of the Basque government, cited above. Full Article 1 below. So far, Brussels has shown itself adamantly opposed to involvement. Probably got enough problems on its plate. Swimming against the historical tide being one of these. Very possibly the biggest one. Which reminds me . . .

The EU and Brexit: The EU may abhor separatism, but its imperial structure encourages it, says one British political columnist this morning. And who could gainsay that? Anyway, posted below – as Article 3 - is the full text of his column. And Article 2 is by an ex Reluctant Remainer who's now convinced the UK should press on with the Brexit, despite the negative consequences. Basically because the EU has shown its nasty, undemocratic hand. And because it might not last anywhere near as long as the Holy Roman Empire. Or even the Ottoman version.

Here in the UK, it's good to read that the police are catching up with their Galician colleagues. It's reported that One in three British motorists is fined every year, as automation technology has created a cash cow for councils and police. But there's some way to go before they manage to fine 3 out of 3 motorists at least once a year. Perhaps they should adopt the Spanish strategy of endlessly changing speed signs.

Still in the UK . . . One has to feel sorry for Costa Coffee. Their €3 cup of coffee is now considered only 'second wave' and is losing market share to 'third wave' beverages which are 'more sophisticated'. Or, as I like to say, even more ludicrously expensive. Soon everyone in the UK will be ordering like they do in Frasier's Seattle. Or is that 'tenth wave'?

Finally . . . Just what we needed – psychiatric advice from British comedian Russell Brand. According to him: We're all on the spectrum. Of madness, I guess. Up to now I'd thought this only applied to women*. . . And to Brand himself. I guess his comment is serious, which rather fits with the fact that I've never found him at all funny.

* Joke.

Today's Cartoon:-

"One of the really nice things about the spring is being able to turn the central heating down a little."

THE ARTICLES

1. Only political dialogue can bring stability to Catalonia – and the EU must help: Iñigo Urkullu, President of the Basque government

The political crisis in Catalonia and how it is resolved will have an impact on the European Union, not just Spain. It highlights the problem of forced integration of a people who have historically expressed a desire for self-governance and voluntary association. This is a political conflict that requires a political solution based on dialogue and negotiation. Such a solution would reconcile reality and realism, legality and legitimacy, and the willingness of regions with different national realities to agree on the terms of their voluntary union.

The crisis is a political one, a consequence of the lack of a political willingness for dialogue, even though honest dialogue is the only peaceful solution. The Spanish government should, now more than ever, after threatening to intervene in legitimate Catalan institutions, open a realistic avenue for dialogue, given that the basic concept of sovereignty is at stake.

I want to propose two principles for that dialogue. The first is the responsibility to avoid any internal political or social clashes between territories. The second principle is that of reality; in other words, recognising that there is popular support for different expressions of the national project in Catalonia, the Basque country and in the rest of the Spanish state.

On my first day in office, I informed the Spanish prime minister of the need for a shared and far-reaching reflection on the relationship that the Basques and the Spanish agreed at the end of the Franco-era dictatorship in 1978. This model ratified the “imposed unity” contained in the 1812 Cadiz constitution and upheld to the present time. It quashed the “voluntary union” model and the historical rights of the Basque people, which did not enjoy protection and respect until the 1978 constitution.

But this reflection has still not begun. I cannot understand or share Madrid’s approach to the decade-long crisis regarding the Basque country, which has now extended to Catalonia. Even less so when, in the Catalan case, the government refuses to address politically a conflict that is political by its very nature, and seeks purely legal answers. I completely reject the extreme measures taken with regard to Catalan civil society and institutions in the past month. These actions will make solving the present impasse even harder.

We have recent and close models that offer us acceptable solutions combining the principles of legality and democracy. The relationship between Quebec and Canada, and the Scottish referendum, are precedents for solving such disputes in a democratic, constructive and civilised way. In both cases, consultations enabled citizens to express their wishes and to see that their opinion had been considered.

In the Basque country, after decades of violence and terrorism, we are promoting a model of self-government that combines nation-building and social construction with the participation of all Basque political traditions.

The premise is coexistence between different identities, based on mutual recognition and respect. This ideal could root a plurinational Spanish state closer to its reality. It would mean the cultural, social and political-legal recognition of the Basque and Catalan nations, along with the Spanish. It proposes an agreed and constructive view of distributing sovereignty. The goal of coexistence between different identities can be achieved by assuming the European concept of co-sovereignty, or shared sovereignty. I therefore advocate setting up legal channels to allow political communities who wish to consult their citizens on their future to be able to do so.

The Catalan crisis is an international legal issue, the outcome of which has a bearing on the future of Europe. This is a future that has been our concern since 1916, when a Basque delegation took part in the Conference of Lausanne. What happens next can and must be resolved between the directly involved parties (as happened in Scotland’s case). But in the absence of this dialogue, there should be an appeal to the EU, which should provide the means for it. As a matter of principle, sure, but also because Europe is not sustainable with such an open conflict. The situation directly affects the future of the European project, and the identification and coexistence of citizens within the union that the project represents.

2. The Harder Brexit Gets, the More Necessary It Seems: Clive Crook

The costs of the split in 2019 will be high -- but it might be now or never.

Waiting will only make it more painful.

Nobody was surprised that the European Union's leaders refused to move the Brexit talks forward at last week's summit. German Chancellor Angela Merkel and European Council President Donald Tusk talked of progress and suggested there'd be more at the next gathering in December, but this speck of encouragement shouldn't obscure the bigger picture. The process is moving too slowly, and with each passing week, the chances of a chaotic U.K. departure from the EU grow.

The closer this calamity comes into view, the more certain it seems that Britain has miscalculated -- and the more I’m coming round to the view that the U.K. was right to want a divorce.

In the debate about Britain and Europe, I've been a reluctant Remainer. The U.K. has been an ill-fitting member of the EU all along. As the union integrates further over the coming years -- which it probably must, if it's to succeed -- Britain's discomfort was bound to grow. The U.K. did need a fundamentally new relationship with the rest of the EU.

But the government should have worked to create this new status -- a kind of associate membership -- from a position of strength inside the union. Its approach to the creation of the euro could have been the model: Be a nuisance, refuse to go along, and win special dispensation. Instead, by giving notice to quit the union altogether, on an EU-determined timetable, the U.K. surrendered most of its bargaining power. That huge tactical error is going to cost.

The stalemate in the exit negotiations is proof. At the same time, though, it draws attention to those very aspects of the European project that most concern so many Brits -- not just the 52 percent who voted to quit (despite endless dire warnings) but also an unknown number of reluctant Remainers like myself.

The difficulty of disentangling EU law from U.K. law, and putting the U.K.'s international commitments back on a sovereign-country basis, is becoming all too clear. The threat of enormous disruption is real. Yet the scale and complexity of this task also show how deeply and broadly the EU has penetrated British governance. Few would argue that Europe's system of democratic accountability has developed to a commensurate degree. So the harder it is to exit, the more glaring the union's "democratic deficit" seems.

For many British commentators, in fact, the coming disruption means this was never a matter of weighing long-term pros and cons of EU membership: There was no real choice, in their view, except to remain. But that draws attention to another problem. The irrevocability of EU membership was not previously advertised. Until recently, Article 50 in the European treaties was supposed to affirm that participation in the project was voluntary, contingent and subject to popular consent. Now it's portrayed by Remainers as a kind of suicide clause.

Remember that the European Union is a work in progress. "Ever closer union" remains a guiding principle, and, with the creation of the euro, deeper integration has become a practical necessity as well. It's happening -- haltingly, messily, and leading in the end who knows where. But if quitting the EU now is hard, how much harder will it be in ten years, or 20? And by then, what kind of union will the EU be?

Thus, on the one hand, the costs of Brexit in 2019 will be high; on the other, it might be now or never.

The current stalemate, in addition, has arisen partly by EU design -- which undercuts Remainers in another way. Europe's chief negotiator has a mandate to achieve "sufficient progress" on the exit payment, the status of EU citizens in the U.K., and the Northern Irish border before moving to discuss the future relationship. This makes a deal much harder to strike. Complex talks succeed through bargains made in parallel across the full range of issues in contention -- not in rigid sequence, with the hardest questions up front.

Presumably this staging was deliberate: It's taken for granted that the EU wants to punish the U.K. for deciding to quit, partly to teach other restless members to behave, and partly because Britain just has it coming. I see the reason in such thinking -- but it doesn't advance the EU's larger purpose of a closer union based on popular consent[

​Ha ha ha].

​

You can strengthen obedience by making examples and threatening reprisals, but you don't build loyalty that way, and loyalty is what the EU most sorely lacks.

The EU should be more confident about its prospects with or without the U.K. If it believes in the strength of its union, and in the power of the four freedoms that the U.K. is reluctant to accept in full, then it should expect Britain to regret departing even if granted terms that cause the minimum disruption to trade and commerce. The EU should believe that the U.K. will see the error of its ways in time, even if the exit goes well. Until then, the EU would surely be better off having a prosperous friend, trading partner and military ally just off its coast, rather than a beaten and resentful enemy.

Britain's tactical choices have been terrible and it faces severe consequences. But, judging by this process so far, the EU isn't much better at seeing where its interests really lie.

Article 3: The EU may abhor separatism, but its imperial structure encourages it: Philip Johnston

The crisis in Spain over Catalonia’s bid for independence is about to come to a head, with a stand-off between Barcelona and Madrid threatening to tear the country apart. The imposition of direct rule by the central government of Mariano Rajoy could precipitate a declaration of independence by Catalonia as early as Thursday.

Three weeks ago, a referendum deemed illegal by Madrid showed 90 per cent in favour of secession on a turnout of 43 per cent. Were the Catalans to declare independence, it would be the first time an EU state has lost part of its territory and Spain would be the first Eurozone member to crack apart. The financial consequences of losing its richest province are impossible to calculate, which is why Madrid is determined to stop it.

There is a school of thought that the potential fragmentation of Europe spells doom for the EU and the Catalans are being egged on by those who would like to see it collapse. Yet the opposite may be true. For potential statelets such as Catalonia, the EU offers an over-arching form of governance able to accommodate their distinct cultural and linguistic characteristics outside of an artificially constructed nation state.

Herein lies the secessionists’ paradox. They want to break away from what they regard as an alien form of governance yet stay in the EU.

Brussels, in turn, seeks to obstruct these separatist movements under a doctrine set out by Romano Prodi, former President of the European Commission. This asserts, though without any legal basis, that a region breaking away from an EU member will automatically be ejected from the club and have to reapply for membership, a protracted process that could take years.

In the meantime, the pariah state would be cut off from the rest of the EU, unable to trade easily and forced to use a different currency. This is why Madrid is calling Catalonia’s bluff: it holds all the cards and the impact on the new country’s economy of leaving the EU without agreement would be huge, even if it does generate much of Spain’s wealth.

For those who believe in the efficacy of the nation state these are difficult issues.

When we look at what is going on from a British position, and especially from an English one, we are anxious to preserve the integrity of the nation. We would not countenance, say, the independence of Yorkshire, or of London for that matter.

Yet we recognise that Scotland was until 1603 a separate kingdom and until 1707 had a separate parliament that pooled its sovereignty with England to form a union. It has the right to break that arrangement should it choose to, and in 2014 it chose not to.

But most European countries do not have a thousand years of nationhood to keep them glued together. Germany was not a nation until unification under Bismarck in 1871 and then again under Kohl in 1990, nor Italy until Risorgimento led by Garibaldi in 1861. Modern Germany encompasses previously powerful states in their own right such as Bavaria and Prussia, though its federal structure and high degree of autonomy keep separatist pressures at bay.

But in Italy the centrifugal forces continue to be felt. Last weekend, two former independent states, Lombardy and the Veneto, held referendums to press for greater autonomy from Rome. Both are run by the Northern League, which objects to subsidising the poorer south.

Will Italy still be in one piece 30 years from now?

Arguably, the existence of the EU as a default form of supra-national governance encourages secession movements. The Prodi doctrine is aimed at countering them, but history is against it.

For centuries much of continental Europe functioned under imperial suzerainty, either through the Holy Roman Empire centred on Germany, Austro-Hungary, Russia or the Ottomans. Living in a country such as ours, whose borders have been pretty well set for 800 years, it is often hard to appreciate the fluidity of European statehood, though recent events should remind us.

Thirty years ago, the old EEC comprised just 12 member states – Spain and Portugal, both had just joined. Today it numbers 28 (soon to be 27), a direct result of the implosion of the old communist empire centred on the Soviet Union.

Its unravelling freed the eastern bloc nations, formerly satellites of Moscow, to go their own way. It also triggered the dismantling of Yugoslavia and the recreation through conflict of the old territories that had once been under the Ottomans or Austro-Hungary.

Few outside Serbia and Russia opposed the right of the Kosovans to break away from the rule of Belgrade and were, indeed, prepared to wage war to allow it. Its secession was judged legal under the concept of self-determination of peoples enshrined in Article One of the UN Charter.

Countries that suppress the legitimate desires of their citizens to be separate political entities are in breach of that provision. So why is Catalonia any different? And yet, if the Spanish army takes to the streets of Barcelona to impose rule from Madrid, the rest of Europe will back the central government against the separatists.

Here lies another paradox. The more starry-eyed Europhiles have always wanted the Union to supplant nations. That was one purpose of Maastricht – to create a European identity and citizenship that would transcend statehood and accommodate every ethnicity and expression of cultural exceptionalism. That is what would-be breakaway nations such as Catalonia want. They don’t seek its destruction.

Perhaps the EU’s destiny is to become an expanded version of the Holy Roman Empire, ruling over scores of nations, autonomous statelets and ethnic groupings. The old empire collapsed after its defeat by Napoleon at Austerlitz in 1805 and was often derided as unwieldy, feudal and inefficient. Voltaire sniffily dismissed it as not holy, not Roman and not an empire, though it did last 800 years.

Unlike the EU, the nation states that rose from the imperial ashes provide a direct connection between the people and the expression of their democratic will. But what happens when that bond is broken and loyalty to the nation breaks down among a large part of its population? Spain is about to find out.